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a corporation,
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vs.

\ Case No. 6207

Beau Brummel, Inc.,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

j

Brief of Appellant

0. W. CARLSON,
J. ~f. CARLSON,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the Slate ol Utah
DOHR~L\X HOTEL SUPPLY CO., )

a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
rs.

Case No. 6207

Beau Brummel, Inc.,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Appellant

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Dohrman Hotel Supply Company, a foreign corporation, with offices and stores at Los Angeles and San
Fran<·isco, brought suit against Appellant for certain
t'('Staurant equipment or the value thereof. The complaint alleges no contract or agreement but alleges
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simply that the plaintiff is the owner of and entitled to
immediate possession of certain restaurant fixtures,
equipment and utensils, and though demand has been
made for their return, defendant has failed to deliver
the same (Ab. 1 and 2), and that the value of the property is $555.08. The alleged value was increased by
amendment to $900 over a year later (Ab. 3 and 4).
Beau Brummell, Inc., denied the alleged ownership
by plaintiff and set up two affirmative answers-First,
that a certain thermotainer charged as part of the purchase price in a contract of sale was defective in construction and design and would not render the service for
which it was sold and purchased and that defendant re.
turned the same to plaintiff and claims a deduction of
$500 from the total purchase price by way of recoupment.
Second, that defendant and plaintiff entered into an
agreement of settlement by which plaintiff agreed to accept the thermotainer on return and allow a credit of $375
and that defendant shipped the thermotainer back and
sent a check for $152.44, the balance of the purchase price.
By way of reply plaintiff admits the return of the
thermotainer and receipt of check for $152.44, but denies
the alleged warranties and denies the alleged agreement
of settlement.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

It was stipulated that the contract of sale between
the parties included many articles not delivered by plaintiff so that 'the price ·of the articles delivered was $2412.26
and a carrying charge of $80.41 was added making the
price of goods plus carrying charge, $2492.67.. Plaintiff
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also admitted cash payments received amounting to
$1966.33 in addition to the $152.44 tendered with the return of the thermotainer. Thus, defendan t maintains the
amount paid plus the credit allowed for the return of
thermotainer plus the $152.44 settled the agreed purchase
price of $2492.17 thus :
Cash paid ..................................................................... $1966.33
Return of thermotainer................................. 375.00
Balance tendered ···················-·········-·················· 152.44
1

Total ________________________________________________________________________ $2493. 77
Over objections by defendant that the sales agreement was not competent to prove reservations therein
under the complaint, which is a general allegation of
ownership, the contract --was admitted and read to the
jury. Don Nelson, an employee of plaintiff, testified
that the value of the property including the thermotainer
in possession of plaintiff is about $900 to $1000, although
he had not seen any of it for two years. Attorney for
plaintiff testified that he told Mr. Glaus before this
suit tha t he would have to pay a balance due or plaintiff
would take the property, but Glaus replied there was no
balance due. Plaintiff then rested.
1

1

1

Defendant produced several witnesses to prove the
settlement agreement alleged in its answer and the warranties as to the thermotainer and its uselessness for the
purpose for which it ·was sold. The parts of the testimony
pertinent to the issue before this Court will be referred
to in the argument later herein. The issues raised in
the lower court as grounds for the directed verdict was
1
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that the authority of the plaintiff's agent, Don Nelson,
to make a settlement contract was not proved; and that
there was not sufficient evidence admitted to prove an
express or implied warranty, or the breach thereof, so
as to entitled defendant to return the thermotainer and
receive credit or recoupment. The Court directed averdict in favor of plaintiff for the possession of the merchandise or the sum of $526.34 the value thereof, which
verdict was signed by the jury as ordered. Ten days
later the Court made a judgment on the verdict but increased the amount of the judgment from $526.34 to
$678.52 plus costs and disbursements.
1

Motion for new trial was made by defendant (Ab. 39)
and denied and a motion to retax costs w:as made by defendant and was granted in part (Ab. 41).
Appellant's Assignment of Errors (Ab. 43) assigns
as error the directing of the verdict, the entering of judgment on the verdict and the denying of appellant's motion
for a new trial. Also, appellant assigns as errors denial
of appellant's motion to retax costs and the allowance
of various cost items, as well as the overruling of defendant's ohpjection to the admission of certain evidence.
POINTS AND AUfHORITIES

Sufficiency of evidence to submit to the jury the
question of Don Nelson's authority to make the contract
alleged.
The testimony on the agency of Don Nelson and the
contract for the return of the thermotainer is as follows:
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Don X elson \Yas the agent for Dohrman Hotel Supply Company and was the only representative here in

1935 (~-\._b. 30). He had been plaintiff's sales representative sine 1929 continuous}.''· Correspondence from Nelson
was receiYed by the company in May, 1935, about Beau
Brumn1el account (Ab. 28). He sold restauran t equipment, also collected money and checks for plaintiff, also
reported on complaints of customers, had attended to
taking back merchandise in dealings \Yith customers and
returned defectiYe materials complained about; was the
only representatiYe of plaintiff here in 1935 and prior
thereto (Ab. 29 and 30). Discussed with customers their
complaints. He tried to sell the thermotainer, when it
was here, to the U. A. C. He had no instructions from
the company (plaintiff) at that time. Mr. Glaus complained about the defects of the steam ta:ble purchased
on the contract. It was not constructed as ordered. N elson gave Glaus orders to employ a tinner and have it
fLxed and charge the bill to plaintiff. Glaus did so and received credit from plaintiff for the expense. Defendant
dealt with Nelson on all previous transactions, collections
and sales (Ah. 14, 25). Mr. Glaus complained to Nelson
about the thermotainer in March, 1935, and the second
time he came herein :May defendant complained that the
thermotainer would not work. It had been taken out and
stored. Glaus said something would have to be done
about it. Nelson said he could move it in his territory.
He said he could take it and sell it on his next trip (Ab.
13). On his next trip further complaints were made by
rl<'l'endant. Nelson said he would write his house. In a
1
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day or two Nelson reported he had a wire from his house
and said if defendant wanted to take a loss of $125 on
the thermotainer they would take it back butt defendant
would have to pay the freight and crating. Nelson did
not tell what he wrote (Ab. 14, 18, 24). Exhibit L, a
letter from respondent dated June 8, 1935, reads that a
proposition will soon be made on the thermotainer. (All
the foregoing evidence is not contradicted and almost all
admitted). Further evidence of plaintiff's is that no telegram was shown defendant by Nelson and no conversation
about buying dishes (Ab. 16, 17, 25 ). Don Nelson testified
he showed Mr. Glaus the telegram which he received from
the Los Angeles office. The purported telegram or copy
was introduced over objections of defendant. It reads:
''Don Nelson:
Will accept return thermotainer at twenty-five
percent discount from purchase price, freight prepaid to Los Angeles provided order you mention is
placed with Los Angeles unit satisfactory credit
terms.
C. E. !tfcCoskey."
Some orders were given Nelson for dishes at about
that time. Gave order f.or $100 worth. Defendant was
compelled 'by the insurance company to replace in the
Mayflower Syracuse china which only the Z. C. M. I.
could sell. There is no dispute as to the fact that the
letter Nelson wrote, to which the telegram was a reply,
was no't shown to defendant. Plaintiff offered in evidence
a letter never seen by defendant, and purporting to be
the letter Don Nelson wrote to Mr. McCloskey in Los
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Angeles. Over objections of defendant that it was selfserving and immaterial it was received as Exhibit M.
This letter notes that it is from Los Angeles, California,
and reads in part that Glaus had paid $500 for the thermotainer •·and eYer sinre I have made this territory he
has been trying to get us to sell it or give him full credit
for it'', and in effect Glaus ·would give an order ''for the
goods he \\ill need for the :Mayflower which will run
around 2 or 3 thousand if we will take back the thermotainer. ''
Appellant con:tends that the foregoing facts present
sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of
the authority of Don Nelson to make the agreement, for
and on behalf of respondent, that was testified to by Mr.
and Mrs. Glaus, namely, that appellant should return the
thermotainer and prepay the freight to Los Angeles for
the credit of $375 or at a 25% loss (Ah.14, 16, 17, 18,24-25
and Ex. 2). The agency is admitted. The only question
is as to the extent of Nelson's authority. The evidence
of past dealings by Nelson show authority to adjust
claims, hear and settle complaints as to defects of merchandise and take return of goods as well as order repairs of equipment sold by respondent, and make collections. Secre1t instructions given by respondent to Nelson
contrary to his apparent authority, and not known to appellant, do not prevent respondent from being bound by
agent Nelson's agreement. "\Ye cite the following authorities in support of our foregoing contention:
The fad of agency and extent thereof is one for the
jury:
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2 Corpus Juris, Section 731 ( 2), p. 960:
''When any evidence is adduced tending to
prove the existence of a disputed agency its existence or nonexistence is as a general rule a question of fact for the jury, aided by proper instructions from the court, even though the evidence is
not full and satisfactory; and in such cases it is
error for the court to take the question from the
jury hy directing a verdict, by instruction, by nonsuit, or by sustaining a demurrer to the evidence.
* * * But even where the facts are undisputed,
if different conclusions can reasonably be drawn
therefrom, the question should be submitted to the
jury."
2 Corpus Juris, Section 733, p. 962:
"Where the nature and extent of an authority
orally conferred upon an agent are to be determined upon conflicting evidence, or to be implied
from the facts and circumstances, the questions
as to the nature and extent of the agent's authority and whe:ther the particular act in controversy
was in the scope of his authority are usually questions of fact for the jury, guided by proper instructions from the court, and in such cases it is error
to take the question from then by nonsuit, instruction, or direction of verdict.''
;2 Gorp us Juris, Section 602, p. 921.
Secret instructions do not relieve the principal from
liability:
Page on Law of Contracts, Vol. 3, p. 3018,
Sec. 1760:
"Outside of the class of public agents the
actual authority conferred hy a principal upon his
agent is practically inaccessable to the public at
large. Accordingly, persons who do not know
what the agent's authority is, are justified in
1
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dealing- with him upon the assumption that he has
authority ·w·hich the principal indicates by his
conduct that the agent possesses.''
Page on Law of Contracts, Vol. 3, p. 3021
''The principal may be estopped to deny the
authority of the agent by actively holding him out
to the world as his agent. Thus, private instructions contrary to the apparent authority of the
agen t and not known to the person dealing with
him, or an uncommunica'ted revocation of the
agent's authority, do not prevent the principal
from being bound by the contract of the agent
made in his behalf with a person acting in good
faith."
:Mechem on Agency, Vol. 1, Sec. 730
''As has already been pointed out a conflict
is often deemed to arise between 'authority' and
'instructions,' and the rule is constantly declared
to be that' an apparent authority cannot be limited
by secret instructions-'"
1

1

Mechem on Agency, Vol. 1, Sec. 734
''The test is, were the alleged instructions designed and calculated to fix and determine the
character of the agent, or merely to prescribe the
manner in which he should exercise the powers
incident to a character already or otherwise imposed 1 As bearing upon this, were the alleged instructions designed to be made known to those
dealing with the agent or concealed, and, as bearing upon this, would their disclosure promote or
defeat his purpose which the principal had in
mind.-''
There is no dispute that Nelson was plaintiff's agent
and was authorized to contract for the return of the thermotainer for a $375 credit and that appellant relied uuon
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such authority and freighted the thermotainer at his ·ex1

pense back to respondent. The instruction to Nelson that
he was to make the con tract if he received the order
spoken of was a secret one and never intended to be communicated to appellan t, for such disclosure to appellant
1

would amount to the agent's saying-you may take a loss
of $125 by the return of the thermotainer and we will
make out of you a good profit on a big order. Such a disclosure would not promote a $2000 or $3000 sale of merchandise but would defeat the purpose of the principal.
There was no intention on the part of McCloskey that
Nelson should disclose the unusual limitation that an
order should be first obtained for $2000 or $3000 before
the $375 credit could be allowed for the return of a $500
machine. The failure of the principal to disclose to appellant the unusual limitation referred to is regarded in
law as a representation that no limitation exists: See
Meech em, Vol. 1, Sec. 735.
DEFENSE OF WARRANTY

The evidence in brief in support of this defense of
appellant's answer is as follows:
The thermotainer is an electrically operated table to
take the place of a steam table and has a cabinet arrangement for retaining foods for long periods of time. It is
supposed to have some advantage over the steam table
because of its construction (A·b. 28). It is supposed to
keep foods hot and moist ready for serving (Ab. 13, 2~
and 23). But this thermotainer dried food out so there
1
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were constant complaints from customers. It was defective right off the reel. It took me (Glaus) a long time to
be convinced it would not work (Ab. 15-16). It was not
adaptable to appellant's use.

I (Glaus) could not

~tell

what the defect was because I am not a mechanic. It was
sold to me to work on the same principle as a steam table
for the kitchen (Ab. 18-19). If it would work we would
never have taken it out of service.

Leland Hogan, the

service man of Utah Power and Light Co., was called
time and again to see what was the matter with it. He
came once or twice a week for a period of time. Tried
using it after each attempt at adjustment but it dried
the meats up (Ab. 23-24). Three witnesses so testified.
Wrote letter of complaint to Dohrmans (Ah. 25). Complained to Nelson. Nelson admitted the complaints (Ab.
30). Thermotainer is so constructed cooks could not
alter inside construction. The average layman doesn't
know anything about it (Ab. 30). Never been another
machine around just like it. Hogan, the service man, said
could not remedy the trouble though he has serviced many
similar ones (Ab. 20-21). Did everything that could be
done without changing the manufactured pattern or construction. But reports that it did not work were made
after each attempt at adjustment. Hogan has studied
thi~ kind of equipment and even built them.
:Manager of respondent who made the sale of the
thermotainer said it is one of the finest pieces of equipment of all; that it originally cost $1500 and that he
would guarantee it (.A b. 12).
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The defense of breach of warranty is pleadable;
see
Cobbey on Replevin (2nd Ed.), Sec. 795, p.
421:
'' *
* In replevin by seller of goods, after
notes given in payment therefor and secured by
mortgage thereon have become overdue, defendant may show payment in part and damages from
breach of warranty. A breach of warranty may
be used as a cause for an original action, a coun teroption of the warrantee. When used as a defense
it is by way of recoupment; that is, it cuts back
and destroys the plaintiff's :fight to recover."
"\V ells on Replevin, p. 518.
"* * * and generally whatever demand the
defendant has growing out of the same subject
ma tter as the plaintiff's claim, may he recouped."
Shipp on Replevin, p. 512.
:J(,

1

1

"Sec. 551 (12) Counter-Claim.-The term
Counter-claim is used in code procedure to include
what is contemplated under the common law procedure, both as a set-off and recoupment. For this
reason there is some confusion in the books. The
true rule regarding a counter-claim seems to be
this: where a claim arises out of the same transac1tion which is the basis of the replevin, i. e.,
when it is in the nature of a recoupment it may be
interposed in replevin; but where it is in the nature of a set-off, i. e. ; consisting of damages not
arising from the same transaction, but from matters outside of it, it cannot be interposed in replevin.''
Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, p. 1514.
"The theory of recoupment is that plaintiff's damages are cut down to an amount which
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will compensate him for the value of what he has
given.''
In this case there is an express warranty as shown
by the evidence and a guarantee of fitness. But there is
also an implied warranty that the thermotainer was reasonably fit for the described purpose of keeping cooked
meats and vegetables hot and moist for later serving and
perform the functions of a steam table; see
Revised Statu~es of Utah, Title 81, ch. 1,
Sec. 15.
"(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and
it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment (·whether he is the grower or
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for
such purpose.''
"(6) An express warranty or condition does
not negative a warranty or condition implied under this title, unless inconsisten:t therewith.''
See 1\L H. Walker Realty Co. v. American
Surety Co., 211 P. 998, 60 U. 435.
Starr Piano Co. v. 1\i[artin, 7 Pac. (2nd) 383
at 386.
In this case action for instalments was brought on a
conditional sales contract and defendant counter-claimed
for breach of warranty of fitness for the purpose for
which sold. The Court said:

'' * * * Furthermore, in a sale such as this
there would he an implied warranty that the equipment which was contracted to ·be sold for a particular purpose, of which the proposed seller ho.J
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full knowledge, was reasonably fit for such purpose.
Chicago Stell Foundry Co. v. F. M. Crowell
Co., 14 Pac. (2nd) 1105.
This is an action for goods sold and defendant count~r-claimed for ·breach of warranty and defectiveness of
material sold. Judgment on the counter-claim was affirmed. The Court said :
''Where an article of personal property is
sold for a definite purpose made known 'to the
seller, and the seller represents that the article
will perform that particular purpose, there is a
warranty of fitness which protects the purchaser
and for which the seller is liable, in event the article fails to do what it was sold to do."
Williams vs. Lowenthall, 12 Pac. (2nd) 75
at 78.
(6, 7). "It may be conceded that, notwithstanding the absence of an express warranty of
fitness, nevertheless the circumstances presented
by the evidence were such that a warranty that the
instrument was fit for the purpose for which it was
sold was raised by implication of law.''
55 Corpus Juris 757.
''The fact that an article has a trade name
does not negative the existence of an implied warran1ty of fitness for a particular purpose when it
is purchased, not by name, but for a particular
purpose and supplied for that purpose. * * * ''
Whether there was an express or implied warranty
that the thermo'tainer was fit for the particular purpose
for which it was sold, is a question of fact for the jury;
see:
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Sperry Flour Co.

Y~.

De l\foss, 18 Pac. (2nd)

242.

'' \Yhether there was implied warranty that
flour sold under trade-name was fit for particular
purpose, and breach thereof 'held' for Jury."
Appellant submits that the trial court erred in refusing to submit to the jury the defense of breach of warranty; that there was sufficient evidence of warranty by
respondent of the fitness of the thermotainer for its use
as a piece of kitchen equipment and there is certainly
abundant evidence of its total unfitness for the purpose
for which it was sold.
Appellants submit also that sufficient evidence to go
to the jury was submitted in support of appellant's defense of agreement of settlement by return of the thermotainer for the credit of $375. Assignments 1, 2, 3, 6
and 7, and 21 of Appellant's assignment of errors pertain
to the direction of verdict, judgment thereon and denial
of appellant's motion for new trial. Said assignments
of error are fully discussed in the foregoing.
Assignments of error numbered 4 and 5 pertain to
the cost bill. Taxable costs are entirely creatures of the
statute and only those costs specifically provided for are
taxable.
Hirch v. Ogden, 51 Utah 553 at 563.
''Costs are only recoverable by force of the
statute, and allowance of them, in any case will
depend on the terms of the statutes.''
11 Cyc. 204 to the same effect.
Parks v. Sutton, 60 Utah 356 at 365.
IIoughston v. Barton, 49 Utah 611.
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There is no statutory provision for allowance of item
for clerk's fees for taking a deposition as described in
assignment of errors number 5. And wi tness fees are
made taxable only for witnesses who attend court; see
section 28-5-8 and 20-8-24 of 1933, Revised Statutes. Also
the statutes are silent on premium for a cost bond for
which respondent lists an item of $30.
1

Respectfully submitted,

0. W. CARLSON,
J. M. CARLSON,
Attorneys for Defendant .

•
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